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“SOMEBODY HELP ME UNDERSTAND 
THIS”: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
INTERPRETATION OF PROSECUTORIAL 
IMMUNITY AND LIABILITY UNDER § 1983 
Kate McClelland* 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 29, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States held in 
Connick v. Thompson1 that a district attorney’s office could not be held 
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a single Brady2 violation by one of its 
prosecutors.  The 5–4 decision split along ideological lines.  The 
conservative branch of the Court refused to hold a district attorney’s office 
liable for what it saw as a single Brady violation by a lone, rogue 
prosecutor.  The liberal wing of the Court interpreted the facts differently, 
and found egregious Brady violations that deprived the respondent of his 
constitutional rights.  The case appalled commentators.3  In their opinion, 
the respondent clearly suffered an injustice at the hands of his prosecutors, 
and yet the Court’s opinion barely acknowledged his suffering and instead 
justified the decision on questionable (if not downright flimsy) grounds.  
One commentator went so far as to call the opinion one of the “meanest” 
Supreme Court decisions ever written.4  The case will have far-reaching 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., University of 
Notre Dame, 2009. 
1 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that it is a violation of due process 
to withhold from the defense evidence that would tend to exculpate the defendant). 
3 See, e.g., Editorial, Failure of Empathy and Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at A26; 
Bennett L. Gershman & Joel Cohen, Cops Are Stupid, But Prosecutors Are Smart, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bennett-l-gershman/cops-
are-stupid-but-prose_b_843583.html; Wendy Kaminer, When the Supreme Court Fears Too 
Much Justice, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/
03/when-the-supreme-court-fears-too-much-justice/73252/; Scott Lemieux, The Impunity of 
the Roberts Court, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Apr. 1, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/impunity-
roberts-court. 
4 Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual: Clarence Thomas Writes One of the Meanest 
1324 KATE MCCLELLAND [Vol. 102 
implications for prosecutorial accountability under Brady and the ability of 
criminal defendants to assert civil rights claims against prosecutors’ offices 
under § 1983. 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision, respondent John Thompson, in 
discussing his conviction, said, “They call it malfeasance of office and get a 
slap on the wrist while I’m up at Angola [the Louisiana State Penitentiary] 
on death row for 18 years.  Somebody help me understand this.”5  But 
practitioners and judges hardly have any clearer idea of when prosecutors 
can be punished for their misconduct.  The Court’s current approach to 
prosecutorial liability under § 1983 is a mess.  The decisions in this area of 
law have made it more difficult for defendants to prove violations of their 
constitutional rights while increasing the strength of prosecutors’ immunity 
for their actions (both individually and collectively as an office).  Even in 
cases like Connick, where everyone agrees that a constitutional violation 
occurred, no punishment results.  Without enforcement, Brady and other 
rules designed to protect a defendant’s rights are effectively negated. 
Currently, a former defendant bringing a § 1983 claim against a 
prosecutor’s office must show a pattern of constitutional violations within 
the office that proves that: (1) the district attorney failed to properly train 
his or her subordinates and (2) that failure to train directly caused the 
violations.6  But the Court has never clearly defined what series of events in 
a prosecutor’s office actually constitutes a “pattern.”  In lieu of a pattern, 
some case law suggests that municipal liability for failure to train can result 
from a “single incident,”7 if the need to train was “so obvious”8 that the 
municipal policymakers responsible for training were deliberately 
indifferent in not training their subordinates.9  However, Connick appears to 
reject the single-incident-liability approach, at least in the case of 
prosecutors’ offices.10 
Part I of this Comment will examine the Connick decision.  This Part 
will walk through the facts of John Thompson’s original case, the 
procedural history of Connick itself, the majority’s reasoning in Connick, 
and the minority’s counterpoints.  Part II will examine the Supreme Court’s 
 
Supreme Court Decisions Ever, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/cruel_but_not_unusual.html. 
5 Richard A. Webster, Life Sentence: Justice Elusive for the Wrongfully Convicted 
Victims, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS. (Jun. 4, 2007), http://www.r-a-e.org/press/life-sentence-
justice-elusive-wrongfully-convicted-victims.   
6 See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1358; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 
U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997). 
7 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989). 
8 Id. 
9 See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361; Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. 
10 See infra notes 189–191 and accompanying text. 
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case law on prosecutorial immunity and municipal liability—precedent that 
ultimately shaped the Connick decision.  Part III will discuss the problems 
with the rule established by Connick and the other cases.  Part IV will 
assess alternatives to requiring the Supreme Court to overhaul its precedent 
in this area, including stricter ethical sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct 
and internal structural reform of prosecutors’ offices.  Finally, Part V will 
argue that the Supreme Court should overrule its precedent and adopt 
absolute immunity for prosecutors to put an end to the current confusion in 
the law. 
I. CONNICK V. THOMPSON 
John Thompson spent eighteen years in prison—fourteen of them on 
death row—for a crime that he did not commit.11  He was charged with the 
murder of the son of a prominent New Orleans businessman in 1985.12  
John Thompson’s face covered the New Orleans press.13  A local father 
whose three minor children had been victims of a recent attempted armed 
robbery showed them a newspaper and asked if Thompson was the man 
who had robbed them.14  They identified him as their attacker.15 
Four prosecutors from the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office 
handled Thompson’s two cases.16  Assistant District Attorneys James 
Williams and Gerry Deegan were assigned to the armed robbery, while 
Williams and Eric Dubelier were assigned to the murder.17  Assistant 
District Attorney Bruce Whittaker approved the armed robbery 
indictment.18  Although Dubelier and Williams were two of the highest 
ranking attorneys in the office at the time, none of the prosecutors had even 
five years of experience as a prosecutor.19  Together the prosecutors made 
the strategic decision to proceed with the armed robbery trial first.20  If 
Thompson were convicted of armed robbery prior to the murder trial, he 
would be vulnerable to impeachment if he took the stand in his defense at 
 
11 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355. 
12 Id. at 1371 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
13 Id. at 1356 (majority opinion). 





19 Id. at 1379.  Williams had been with the office for four-and-a-half years, Dubelier for 
three-and-a-half years, Whittaker for three years, and Deegan for less than one year.  Id. at 
1372 n.3. 
20 Id. at 1372. 
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the murder trial.21 
The armed robber left blood behind on the pant leg of one of his 
victims.22  A crime lab technician took a swatch of the bloodied fabric from 
the pants and sent it to the crime lab one week before Thompson’s armed 
robbery trial.23  Whittaker received the report from the crime lab, and 
placed it on Williams’s desk, but Williams denied ever seeing it in his later 
testimony at trial.24  Meanwhile, Deegan checked out all of the physical 
evidence in the case from the police property room on the first day of trial, 
including the bloody swatch.25  But when he checked all of the evidence 
into the courthouse property room, the swatch was missing.26  Thompson’s 
defense counsel never learned of its existence, and Thompson was 
convicted of the armed robbery.27  Because of this conviction, he did not 
testify at his later murder trial, and later in 1985 he was also convicted of 
first-degree murder.28 
In 1994, Deegan was dying.29  He confessed to his friend and fellow 
prosecutor Michael Riehlmann that he had hidden exculpatory blood 
evidence during Thompson’s armed robbery trial.30  Riehlmann did not tell 
anyone about this conversation for five years.31 
In 1999, Thompson’s private investigator—in a last-ditch effort to 
save his client from being executed—reexamined all of the prosecution’s 
files on Thompson’s cases.32  He uncovered the crime lab report on the 
blood evidence from the armed robbery.33  The robber’s blood was Type 
B.34  Thompson is Type O.35  When the new information came forward, a 
judge vacated the armed robbery conviction and in 2003, when he was 
retried for murder, Thompson was found not guilty.36 
After his release from prison in 2003, John Thompson filed suit 
against the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney 
 
21 Id. 





27 Id. at 1373 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
28 Id. at 1356 (majority opinion). 
29 Id. at 1374 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1375. 




36 Id. at 1357. 
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Harry Connick Sr., James Williams, and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.37  
Thompson alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights 
under Brady38 by withholding the crime lab report.39  Thompson put 
forward two theories.40  First, he claimed that the district attorney’s office 
had an unconstitutional Brady policy.41  In the alternative, he alleged that 
regardless of what Orleans Parish’s official Brady policy was, the violation 
resulted from Connick’s deliberate indifference to the need to train his 
subordinates in proper Brady procedure.42  In district court, the jury rejected 
the first claim, but agreed with Thompson that Connick was deliberately 
indifferent to the need to train.43  They awarded Thompson $14 million in 
damages44—$1 million for each year that he was on death row.45 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, divided 
evenly on the failure-to-train issue, thus upholding the district court 
judgment.46  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari “to decide whether 
a district attorney’s office may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to 
train based on a single Brady violation.”47  In a 5–4 decision, the Court held 
that an office could not be held liable based on a single Brady violation.48 
Justice Thomas wrote the Court’s opinion.49  He reasoned that 
Thompson’s claim could not succeed because he did not prove a pattern of 
violations that would indicate a failure to train prosecutors.50  Moreover, 
Thompson did not prove that the single violation in his case was sufficient 
to give rise to liability.51 
Consistent with precedent, the opinion stated that “[a] pattern of 
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily 
necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to 
 
37 Id. 
38 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that it is a violation of due process 
to withhold from the defense evidence that would tend to exculpate the defendant). 
39 Id. 





45 James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, 14 Years on Death Row. $14 Million in Damages?, 
MOTHER JONES (October 6, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/09/
connick-v-thompson. 
46 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1358. 
47 Id. at 1356. 
48 Id. at 1355. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1360. 
51 Id. at 1361. 
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train.”52  Thomas stated that Thompson did not try to prove a pattern.53  Yet 
Thompson did reference four convictions from Orleans Parish that were 
overturned by Louisiana courts in the ten years prior to his armed robbery 
trial due to the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.54  Those cases, 
however, were not “similar to the violation at issue” in Thompson’s case 
because the disputed evidence was not scientific, like Thompson’s blood 
evidence was.55 
The single Brady violation at issue in the case was also not enough on 
its own to establish liability.56  In Canton v. Harris, the Court hypothesized 
a situation in which specific legal training was so clearly needed that the 
failure to give employees that training would necessarily lead to 
constitutional violations.57  Here, Thomas reasoned, the assistant district 
attorneys already had the legal training that they needed.58  They had all 
received a law license, graduated from law school, and passed the bar 
examination.59  Continuing education classes were readily available,60 and 
they had the opportunity to learn on the job from their superiors,61 who 
would circulate information about important cases and legal 
 
52 Id. at 1360 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 
(1997)). 
53 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360. 
54 Id.  The Supreme Court was well aware of the Brady violations occurring in the 
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office.  The suppression of exculpatory statements by a 
codefendant in violation of Brady, which took place in a 1984 Orleans Parish case, also 
made it to the Supreme Court on appeal in 1995.  See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
55 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360. 
56 Id. at 1361. 
57 Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)).  Harris envisions 
a scenario where police are given deadly weapons to use in the field, but are not trained in 
the constitutional use of deadly force.  In that case, a single incident of deadly force by an 
officer would be sufficient to hold the municipality liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a 
violation of constitutional rights.  See Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10; see also infra Part II.B. 
58 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361. 
59 Id.  But cf. id. at 1385 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citing multiple facts from the trial 
record and the Justice’s own research that would undermine this confidence in the presence 
of Brady in law schools and the Louisiana Bar Examination). 
60 Id. at 1362 (majority opinion).  But cf. id. at 1381 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) 
(“Louisiana did not require continuing legal education at the time of Thompson’s trials.” 
(citations omitted)). 
61 Id. at 1362 (majority opinion).  But cf. id. at 1380 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“Dubelier 
and Williams, as senior prosecutors in the Office, were free to take cases to trial without 
[attending a pretrial conference with the Office’s chief of trials], and that is just how they 
proceeded in Thompson’s prosecutions.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 1379–80 
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“By 1985, Dubelier and Williams were two of the highest ranking 
attorneys in the Office, yet neither man had even five years of experience as a prosecutor . . . 
[they] told the jury that they did not recall any Brady training in the Office.”  (citations 
omitted)). 
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developments.62  Moreover, the attorneys were held to strict character and 
fitness standards and the ethical standards imposed by the legal 
community.63  Simply put, “[a]ttorneys are trained in the law and equipped 
with the tools to interpret and apply legal principles, understand 
constitutional limits and exercise legal judgment.”64  Given these factors, 
Connick had no reason to believe that his assistants needed any further 
training.65 
Additionally, Thomas pointed out, all of the assistant district attorneys 
working on Thompson’s case knew about the general rule of Brady v. 
Maryland.66  Thompson’s arguments appeared to suggest that formal 
training was needed,67 but a lack of formal training was not the equivalent 
of the complete lack of legal training hypothesized in Harris.68  While 
additional training might have been helpful for the prosecutors, the Court 
held that a lack of such training was not enough to impose liability.69 
II. THE PRECEDENT THAT SHAPED CONNICK 
Connick’s reasoning is so convoluted because it combines two prior 
lines of Supreme Court case law.  The first line of cases present in Connick 
deals with prosecutorial immunity.70  Those cases establish a functional test 
to determine whether prosecutors have absolute or qualified immunity for 
their actions.  Prosecutors have absolute immunity for many of their 
actions, but when they have only qualified immunity, they may be liable 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  According to this statute: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
 
62 Id. at 1362 (majority opinion).  But cf. id. at 1381 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“The 
[1987 Office policy] manual contained four sentences, nothing more, on Brady.  This slim 
instruction, the jury learned, was notably inaccurate, incomplete, and dated.” (footnote 
omitted) (citations omitted)). 
63 Id. at 1362 (majority opinion).  But cf. id. at 1382 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) 
(“[Connick] never disciplined or fired a single prosecutor for violating Brady.”  (citation 
omitted)). 
64 Id. at 1361 (majority opinion). 
65 Id. at 1363. 
66 Id.  But cf. id. at 1378 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“Connick was the Office’s sole 
policymaker, and his testimony exposed a flawed understanding of a prosecutor’s Brady 
obligations.”). 
67 Id. at 1363 (majority opinion).  But cf. id. at 1378 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) 
(“Thompson, it bears emphasis, is not complaining about the absence of formal training 
sessions.  His complaint does not demand that Brady compliance be enforced in any 
particular way.  He asks only that Brady obligations be communicated accurately and 
genuinely enforced.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)). 
68 Id. at 1363 (majority opinion). 
69 Id. 
70 See infra Part II.A. 
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of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 
in equity or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .71 
If a prosecutor with qualified immunity violates a defendant’s 
constitutional rights (and thereby § 1983), the defendant may sue the 
municipality that employs the prosecutor for monetary damages to 
recompense the violation.72 
The second line of cases implicated in Connick deals with this 
municipal liability under § 1983.73  Municipalities cannot be held liable 
under § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory.74  For § 1983 to apply, 
the municipality’s official policy must be the direct cause of the 
constitutional violation.75  A policy failing to properly train employees and 
directly causing a recurring pattern of constitutional violations demonstrates 
deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality and results in § 1983 
liability.76  The plaintiff must show (1) that municipal policymakers chose a 
policy that failed to train the municipality’s employees adequately, (2) the 
policy amounted to deliberate indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights, 
and (3) the policy directly caused (4) a pattern of violations of 
constitutional rights.  Alternatively, at least prior to Connick, a plaintiff 
could also show that a single action by a municipal employee was so 
egregious that it was obvious that the municipality was deliberately 
indifferent to the need to train that employee.77 
A. THE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY CASES 
The Supreme Court decided its first case on prosecutorial immunity, 
Imbler v. Pachtman, in 1976.78  In Imbler, the Court established the 
 
71 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2006). 
72 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).  It is far more common to see § 1983 
actions brought against police officers, particularly for the use of excessive force in 
contravention of an arrestee’s constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 
386 (1989). 
73 See infra Part II.B. 
74 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).  In other words, one 
municipal employee’s violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights does not automatically 
confer damages liability on the municipality.  See id. 
75 See id. at 694. 
76 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 397 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see 
also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997).  
77 See Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 (1989). 
78 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409.  Paul Imbler was found guilty of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death.  Id. at 412.  After the resolution of the case, Richard Pachtman, the 
prosecutor on the case, wrote to the Governor of California stating that he had uncovered 
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functional test to determine whether absolute or qualified immunity should 
apply to a prosecutor.79  Section 1983 did not eliminate immunities “well 
grounded in history and reason”80—including absolute immunity for 
prosecutors.81  The Court cited various public policy reasons why 
prosecutors had been given absolute immunity at common law, which were 
still important.82  Prosecutors were quasi-judicial officers who, like judges, 
required protection for actions that were “intimately associated with the 
judicial phase of the criminal process.”83  Moreover, the possibility of 
professional discipline for ethical violations served as a check on their 
behavior.84  However, the Court stated explicitly that it was not 
“consider[ing] whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those 
aspects of the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of 
administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.”85  
Determining whether a prosecutor was protected by absolute immunity thus 
depended on the nature of the role he was engaged in when the alleged 
violation took place.  If the prosecutor was acting as an advocate—
“initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case”—he received 
absolute immunity.86  The Court reserved the question of what type of 
immunity applied when the prosecutor was functioning as an investigator or 
an administrator.87 
Burns v. Reed partially addressed this question by holding that 
prosecutors acting in an investigatory capacity were only entitled to 
qualified immunity.88  The Supreme Court held that a prosecutor has 
 
new evidence that corroborated Imbler’s alibi defense.  Id.  A key eyewitness also recanted 
his prior identification testimony.  Id. at 413.  After years of litigation on these issues, the 
Ninth Circuit granted Imbler’s habeas petition, and he filed a § 1983 action against 
Pachtman and others.  Id. at 415. 
79 Id. at 430. 
80 Id. at 418 (citations omitted). 
81 Id. at 424. 
82 Id. at 424–27. 
83 Id. at 430. 
84 Id. at 429. 
85 Id. at 430–31. 
86 Id. at 431. 
87 Id. at 430–31. 
88 500 U.S. 478 (1991).  Petitioner Cathy Burns had called the police, claiming that an 
unknown intruder entered her home and shot her two young sons.  Id. at 481.  The officers 
assigned to the case treated Burns as the primary suspect.  Id.  Theorizing that she had 
multiple personality disorder, they wanted to question her under hypnosis.  Id. at 482.  They 
asked the Chief Deputy Prosecutor, Richard Reed, whether they could use hypnosis, and he 
advised them that they could.  Id.  Reed used the results of the interview under hypnosis at a 
probable cause hearing, and Burns was charged with the attempted murder of her sons.  Id. at 
482–83.  A judge later granted her motion to suppress the evidence gained under hypnosis 
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absolute immunity for her actions during a probable cause hearing because 
she is acting in her role as “advocate for the State.”89  When a prosecutor 
advises the police about what investigative techniques they are able to use 
to obtain evidence, however, only qualified immunity protects her.90  The 
Court rejected the idea that under the common law this advice would have 
been protected too.91  Protected activity needed a sufficient link to the court 
proceeding, because “the concern with litigation in our immunity cases is 
not merely a generalized concern with interference with an official’s duties, 
but rather is a concern with interference with the conduct closely related to 
the judicial process.”92  While the Court acknowledged that almost any 
purely investigative activity could be linked to the decision to prosecute, the 
protection of absolute immunity only extended to actions intimately 
associated with the judicial process.93 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons further clarified the limits of advocacy as 
opposed to investigation.94  The Supreme Court found that the prosecutors 
were acting in an investigative capacity when they had expert after expert 
assess the evidence in the case until they found one whose testimony 
aligned with their theory of the case.95  The Court appeared to establish a 
new bright-line rule: “A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself 
to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.”96  
The majority appeared to be saying that the advocacy function—and thus 
 
and upon her release from custody, she filed a § 1983 action against Reed, the police, and 
others.  Id. at 483. 
89 Id. at 491. 
90 Id. at 496. 
91 Id. at 493. 
92 Id. at 494. 
93 Id. at 495. 
94 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261 (1993).  Stephen Buckley had been 
imprisoned for three years for the highly publicized murder of a young girl that took place in 
1983.  Id. at 261.  He claimed liability under § 1983 for fabricated evidence and false 
statements made by Fitzsimmons, the DuPage County state’s attorney, at a press conference 
about the case.  Id. at 262.  The girl’s killer had kicked in the door of her home, leaving 
behind a bootprint.  Id.  The prosecutors tried to match the print to petitioner’s boots.  Id.  
Three respected and credible evidence labs found no match, but prosecutors located an 
anthropologist of questionable credibility who would testify that the print was made by 
Buckley’s boots.  Id.  A grand jury spent eight months investigating all of the evidence, 
including the bootprint evidence, and was unable to return an indictment.  Id. at 264.  
Fitzsimmons was running for reelection in a close race in early 1984.  Id.  Before that 
election, he brought an indictment against Buckley and held the press conference to 
announce it.  Id.  Buckley was not freed until 1987, when the anthropologist and star witness 
in his case died and could no longer testify at his retrial—even though his first trial had 
ended in a mistrial and another man had confessed to the crime.  Id. 
95 Id. at 274. 
96 Id. 
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absolute immunity—does not take hold until after a finding of probable 
cause.97  As to the press conference that was held in conjunction with the 
defendant’s indictment, the Court noted that at common law, prosecutors 
had immunity for defamation that occurred as a part of judicial proceedings, 
but not for out-of-court statements.98  Moreover, the conduct of a press 
conference is unrelated to a prosecutor’s duties as an advocate—“a 
prosecutor is in no different position than other executive officials who deal 
with the press, and . . . qualified immunity is the norm for them.”99 
In Kalina v. Fletcher, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that a 
prosecutor was entitled to only qualified immunity when she executed the 
certification required by local court rule that required that she essentially act 
as a complaining witness and swear to the facts alleged as the basis for 
probable cause and the issuance of an arrest warrant.100  The preparation 
and filing of such a certification fell under the advocacy function,101 but the 
prosecutor was performing the function of a complaining witness when she 
made false statements of fact in the certification under penalty of perjury.102  
The Court emphasized that “[t]estifying about facts is the function of the 
witness, not of the lawyer.”103 
In Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, the final case in this line prior to 
Connick, a unanimous Supreme Court described for the first time what a 
prosecutor’s “administrative” functions might look like.104  The Court held 
 
97 See id. at 286 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
98 Id. at 277 (majority opinion). 
99 Id. at 278. 
100 522 U.S. 118, 129–31 (1997).  In Kalina, Lynne Kalina, a deputy prosecuting 
attorney for King County, Washington, filed three documents with the King County Superior 
Court to bring charges against respondent Rodney Fletcher.  Id. at 120–121.  One document 
was an information charging Fletcher with burglary, one was a motion for an arrest warrant, 
and the third was called a “Certification for Determination of Probable Cause.”  Id. at 121.  
According to a local rule, an arrest warrant must be accompanied by an affidavit or “sworn 
testimony establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant.”  Id. (quoting WASH. SUP. CT. 
CRIM. R. 2.2(a)).  Typically, a complaining witness provides the affidavit, but here, Kalina 
swore to the affidavit herself.  Id. at 129–30.  It contained two inaccurate factual statements.  
Id. at 121.  As a result of Kalina’s filing, Fletcher was arrested and spent a day in jail.  Id. at 
122.  The prosecutor’s office later dropped charges against him.  Id. 
101 Id. at 129. 
102 Id. at 131. 
103 Id. at 130. 
104 555 U.S. 335, 338–39 (2009).  Thomas Goldstein was convicted of murder in 1980, 
based largely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant.  Id. at 339.  In his federal habeas 
petition, the District Court found that if prosecutors had informed the defense that the 
informant was receiving a reward for his testimony, it might have made a difference in 
Goldstein’s case.  Id.  The habeas petition was granted, and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  Id.  Goldstein then filed a § 1983 action against former District Attorney 
Van de Kamp and his chief deputy district attorney, alleging that prosecutors violated his 
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that the training, supervision, and information system management at issue 
were administrative functions—but they were nonetheless directly related to 
the conduct of the trial, and therefore entitled to absolute immunity.105  The 
functions at issue “necessarily require[d] legal knowledge and the exercise 
of related discretion.”106  The Court cited Imbler’s public policy concerns, 
particularly the chilling effect that liability would have.107  Since 
“[d]ecisions about indictment or trial prosecution will often involve more 
than one prosecutor within an office,”108 multiple prosecutors could be 
liable under qualified immunity for the types of decisions at issue in Van de 
Kamp.  If many prosecutors were liable for these decisions, then they would 
behave differently because the risk of § 1983 liability might lessen their 
willingness to prosecute.109 
The Supreme Court began in Imbler with a functional test that seemed 
clear and simple to apply.  With each subsequent case, the Court chipped 
away at the advocatory, investigative, and administrative distinctions.  After 
Van de Kamp, the Court had determined that so many prosecutorial 
functions were intimately associated with the conduct of the trial that the 
functional test had lost its meaning. 
B. THE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CASES 
The failure-to-train concept of Van de Kamp came from the line of 
cases relating to municipal liability that was developing alongside the 
prosecutorial immunity cases.  The first case in this line is Monell v. 
Department of Social Services of the City of New York.110  In Monell, the 
Court overruled an earlier case, Monroe v. Pape, which held that 
municipalities were wholly immune from liability under § 1983.111  Delving 
 
constitutional rights when they refused to turn over the information on the informant in 
violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding that the failure on the part 
of a United States Attorney to disclose the fact that the prosecution witness had been offered 
immunity for his testimony was a violation of due process), and that the violation occurred 
as a result of a failure by Van de Kamp to properly train and supervise his assistants.  Id. at 
340.  He also alleged that Van de Kamp’s office should have had an information system 
about informants to prevent such an occurrence.  Id. 
105 Id. at 344. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 345. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 346–47. 
110 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  A group of female employees filed a § 1983 action against the 
Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York for 
forcing them to take unnecessary, unpaid medical leave while they were pregnant.  Id. at 
660–61. 
111 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). 
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into the legislative history of § 1983,112 the Court determined that 
municipalities could face liability if “official municipal policy of some 
nature caused a constitutional tort.”113  However, municipalities could not 
be held liable just because they employed someone who committed a 
constitutional tort—that is, respondeat superior did not apply.114  The 
municipality’s policy or custom had to be the “moving force,” or direct 
cause, of the violation.115 
In the next three cases in this line—Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, Pembaur 
v. Cincinnati, and City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik—the Court was often 
badly divided on reasoning.  These three cases failed to clarify the holding 
of Monell either by defining the terms “official policy” and “policymaker” 
for the purpose of determining liability or by explaining how to show that a 
particular policy directly caused constitutional violations.  Instead, as the 
Second Circuit notes in Walker v. City of New York: 
The combination of [Tuttle, Pembaur, and Praprotnik] necessarily molds many 
§ 1983 claims against municipalities into “failure to train” or “failure to supervise” 
claims.  It is only by casting claims in this way that plaintiffs can link an actual 
decision by a high level municipal official to the challenged incident.116 
This is why prosecutorial liability cases like Connick and Van de 
Kamp eventually became framed as § 1983 cases alleging that a district 
attorney failed to train his subordinates properly.  This group of cases 
required plaintiffs to plead their claims as constitutional violations resulting 
from a high-level municipal policymaker in order to succeed in a § 1983 
action. 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Oklahoma City v. Tuttle found a single 
incident of the use of excessive force by a police officer insufficient to 
prove a failure to train.117  There had to be some additional evidence to 
show that “policymakers deliberately chose a training program which 
would prove inadequate.”118 
Pembaur v. Cincinnati clarified that it was still possible for a single act 
to give rise to liability, but only if it resulted from the decision of a 
 
112 Monell, 436 U.S. at 665–89. 
113 Id. at 691. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 694. 
116 Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1992). 
117 City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985).  The widow of a man 
shot and killed by a police officer brought suit under § 1983, asserting that the city’s policy 
resulted in inadequate training for the officer who shot her husband, which in turn produced 
a deprivation of her husband’s constitutional rights.  Id. at 811–12. 
118 Id. at 823 (emphasis added). 
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municipal policymaker.119  A plurality of the Court found that the police 
had acted pursuant to the direction of the county prosecutor in executing an 
arrest warrant.  The county prosecutor, who was acting as county 
policymaker, and the county could therefore be held liable.120  The plurality 
suggested that the proper definition of a policymaker was “the 
decisionmaker [who] possesses final authority to establish municipal policy 
with respect to the action ordered.”121 
Again in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, a plurality of the Court 
reaffirmed that state law decides who the policymaker is.122  Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence indicated that state law was a starting point, but that 
the fact-finder should determine where policymaking power actually lay.123  
Yet the plurality concluded that even when the policymaker delegated 
decisions to subordinates, the municipality could be held liable.124 
The following year, in Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court specified 
that a municipal policymaker had to show “deliberate indifference” to the 
need to train his subordinates for the Court to find liability under § 1983.125  
The Court found the city’s overall policy regarding the medical treatment of 
persons in custody to be constitutional.126  It determined that the city could 
not be liable for an unconstitutional application of the policy that was 
caused by a failure to train.127  The Court held that “the inadequacy of 
police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the 
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons 
with whom the police come into contact.”128  Additionally, only where 
deliberate indifference to the need to train was the “moving force” behind 
 
119 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).  In Pembaur, a doctor 
brought a § 1983 action against the city of Cincinnati, the county of Hamilton, and others 
based on police action taken in the execution of arrest warrants in his office.  Id. at 473–74. 
120 Id. at 474. 
121 Id. at 481.  But cf. id. at 498 (Powell, J., dissenting).  “[The Court’s] reasoning is 
circular: it contends that policy is what policymakers make, and policymakers are those who 
have the authority to make policy.”  Id. 
122 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988).  An architect employed by 
the city of St. Louis filed suit against the city alleging a violation of his constitutional rights 
during the course of his work for the city and in his eventual firing.  Id. at 114–17. 
123 Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
124 Id. at 127. 
125 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).  Geraldine Harris alleged that Canton, Ohio’s policy 
regarding medical treatment in police custody was unconstitutional and had resulted in 
inadequate treatment for her while she was in police custody in violation of § 1983.  Id. at 
381. 
126 Id. at 386. 
127 Id. at 387. 
128 Id. at 388. 
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the constitutional violation is the municipality liable.129  One officer’s 
unsatisfactory response to a situation is not necessarily a failure to train.130 
However, in dicta, the Court explored the possibility of a situation 
where “the need for more or different training [was] so obvious . . . that the 
policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately 
indifferent to the need.”131  The obvious need for training plus a single 
incident of misconduct by a municipal actor could result in a constitutional 
violation that would be actionable under § 1983 in at least one instance: 
[C]ity policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be 
required to arrest fleeing felons.  The city has armed its officers with firearms, in part 
to allow them to accomplish this task.  Thus, the need to train officers in the 
constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force can be said to be “so obvious,” 
that failure to do so could properly be characterized as “deliberate indifference” to 
constitutional rights.132 
In other words, if one police officer untrained in the constitutional 
limits of deadly force were to shoot a fleeing suspect, in contravention of 
Tennessee v. Garner,133 that single incident would be enough to give rise to 
municipal liability under § 1983. 
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Harris also introduced the idea of a 
“pattern of constitutional violations” for the first time in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.134  She argued that repeated constitutional violations by a 
municipality’s employees would put the municipality “on notice that its 
officers confront the particular situation on a regular basis, and that they 
often react in a manner contrary to constitutional requirements.”135  She 
noted that lower courts that had adopted the “deliberate indifference” 
requirement often used a pattern of violations to infer that deliberate 
indifference was present.136  The pattern requirement advocated by 
O’Connor and the lower courts eventually became an official requirement 
for proving deliberate indifference in Board of County Commissioners of 
Bryan County v. Brown.137 
Bryan County considered a § 1983 claim resulting from a traffic stop 
where a police officer forcibly removed a passenger from a vehicle, 
 
129 Id. at 389. 
130 Id. at 390–91. 
131 Id. at 390 (emphasis added). 
132 Id. at 390 n.10 (citations omitted). 
133 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985) (holding that the use of deadly force by an officer to apprehend 
a suspect is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement). 
134 Harris, 489 U.S. at 397 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997). 
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resulting in injuries.138  The Court held that the county was not liable under 
§ 1983 for the sheriff’s single decision to hire the officer who injured the 
respondent, despite the officer’s violent history.139  The hiring decision, 
which was legal and constitutional, was not the “moving force,” or direct 
cause, of the injuries.140  To find deliberate indifference and hold the sheriff 
liable under § 1983, the respondent could not just show that there was some 
probability that an improperly reviewed hire would inflict an injury—she 
had to show “that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular 
injury suffered by the plaintiff.”141  Despite this officer’s allegedly violent 
background, it was not “plainly obvious” to the sheriff when he hired the 
officer that this history would result in constitutional violations.142  
Deliberate indifference by the sheriff could have been proved by either a 
“continued adherence to an approach that [he knew] or should [have 
known] has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees” or “the 
existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees 
[that] . . . is the ‘moving force’ behind the plaintiff’s injury.”143  The Court 
showed that it would be very reluctant to use a single-incident analysis to 
hold municipalities liable under § 1983 without a very explicit causal 
connection between the single incident (or single bad decision) and the 
constitutional violation. 
Tuttle, Pembaur, and Praprotnik framed municipal liability in terms of 
“failure-to-train” claims.  O’Connor’s concurrence in Harris and the 
opinion in Bryan County established the necessity of a pattern of 
constitutional violations in order to prove a failure to train, but Harris 
raised the possibility of single-incident liability in cases of truly egregious 
constitutional violations.  These two alternatives for establishing municipal 
liability under § 1983 set the stage for Connick v. Thompson. 
 
138 Id. at 400–01.  Respondent Jill Brown was the passenger in the car that her husband 
was driving.  Id.  When he turned around to avoid a police checkpoint, he was pursued in a 
high-speed chase by Deputy Sheriff Robert Morrison and Reserve Deputy Stacy Burns.  Id.  
Burns approached on Jill Brown’s side of the vehicle, and when she would not exit, he 
forcibly pulled her out of the vehicle, resulting in severe knee injuries.  Id. at 400–01.  Burns 
was the son of the nephew of the county sheriff.  Id. at 401.  He had a criminal record that 
included several driving infractions and misdemeanors, including assault and battery.  Id.  
While that did not prevent him from being hired as a peace officer under Oklahoma law, 
Brown argued that the sheriff had not adequately reviewed this background in making his 
decision to hire Burns.  Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 405. 
141 Id. at 412. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 407–08. 
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III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S APPROACH IN CONNICK 
After reviewing both the prosecutorial immunity and municipal 
liability precedent, the Supreme Court concluded in Connick that a district 
attorney’s office could not be held liable under § 1983 for a Brady violation 
by one of its assistant district attorneys.  There are numerous problems with 
how the Court arrived at this rule.  First, the functional approach has proven 
weak as a mechanism for determining when prosecutors should be given 
qualified, rather than absolute, immunity.  Second, the Court’s decisions 
have yet to satisfactorily answer what a “pattern” of constitutional 
violations giving rise to liability would look like.  Third, the Court’s alleged 
common law foundation for prosecutorial immunity is tenuous at best.  
Ultimately, poorly reasoned decisions have granted prosecutors—and their 
municipalities—de facto absolute immunity for their actions. 
A. THE FAILINGS OF THE FUNCTIONAL TEST 
The Supreme Court’s functional test for determining what type of 
immunity applies to a prosecutor has been plagued with problems since 
Imbler v. Pachtman.144  As the Court applies the test to different factual 
scenarios, its failings are readily clear.  The federal circuits are specifically 
struggling with the implications of the functional test in situations where 
prosecutors not only hide exculpatory evidence, but also actively falsify 
evidence.  Falsification of evidence would likely take place during the 
investigatory phase of a prosecution, when the prosecutor is only protected 
by qualified immunity.  However, the false evidence cannot actually be 
used in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights until trial, when the 
prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity.  When the functional divide 
is taken to its logical extent, it means that prosecutors are protected by 
absolute immunity for falsifying evidence. 
1.  Practical Problems with the Functional Test 
The functional test for determining liability has been criticized since 
the days of Imbler.145  The administrative, investigatory, and advocatory 
lines cannot be drawn as clearly in the real world as the Supreme Court has 
assumed.146  As one author phrased it, “[t]he existence of cases defying 
easy categorization reveals an inherent weakness in the functional 
approach—the approach implicitly assumes that every prosecutorial act fits 
 
144 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
145 See Anthony J. Luppino, Supplementing the Functional Test of Prosecutorial 
Immunity, 34 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1982). 
146 Id. at 504. 
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in one, and only one, category.”147 
Additionally, the functional test creates an incentive for prosecutors to 
claim that almost everything they do is a part of their function as advocates, 
thus ensuring absolute immunity for their acts.  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons148 
helps make this easy for prosecutors.  It stated the bright-line rule that “[a] 
prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before 
he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.”149  But there is “no useful 
indication of at what point probable cause will be ‘had’ or who is to 
determine its existence.”150 
The functional test gives criminal defendants-turned-claimants bad 
incentives too.  As Justice Kennedy noted in his dissent in Buckley, the 
Court weakened its stance against the tort of malicious prosecution by 
introducing this bright-line rule.151  In Imbler, the Court had made it clear 
that it wanted to preserve the common law absolute immunity for 
prosecutors accused of malicious prosecution.152  Buckley’s bright-line rule 
ends up functioning as a pleading rule for claimants; as long as they include 
at least some of a prosecutor’s pre-probable cause conduct in their 
pleadings, malicious prosecution claims are no longer easily dismissed.153  
Instead, frivolous malicious prosecution claims survive longer in the courts 
disguised as § 1983 claims. 
Moreover, the distinction between advocatory acts and investigatory 
acts is not principled—it has been described as “inherently elusive and 
highly questionable.”154  Kennedy’s dissent in Buckley points out that what 
the Court labels “investigation” could easily be termed “preparation for 
trial.”155  Preparatory actions should be protected.  They “must be free of 
 
147 Id. at 493. 
148 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 286–87 (1993); see also supra notes 94–99 
and accompanying text (discussing Buckley). 
149 Id. at 274; see also Megan M. Rose, Note, The Endurance of Prosecutorial 
Immunity—How the Federal Courts Vitiated Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1019, 
1044 (1996). 
150 Rose, supra note 149, at 1044. 
151 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 286–87 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
152 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421–28 (1976). 
153 See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 286–87 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); James P. Kenner, Note, 
Prosecutorial Immunity: Removal of the Shield Destroys the Effectiveness of the Sword, 33 
WASHBURN L.J. 402, 426 (1994).  But see Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265 (2006) 
(finding that the “presumption of regularity behind the charging decision” may be overcome 
by showing a lack of probable cause in addition to a retaliatory motive of the prosecutor 
bringing the charges). 
154 Erwin Chemerinsky, Prosecutorial Immunity—The Interpretation Continues, TRIAL, 
Mar. 1998, at 80, 80. 
155 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 284 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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the distortive effects of potential liability.”156  Otherwise, preparation is 
punished.  A prosecutor who has properly and extensively investigated his 
case prior to a probable cause determination may find himself civilly liable 
for his decisions and actions, which have all taken place in the 
“investigatory” phase.  Meanwhile, a prosecutor who does not open the case 
file until after the probable cause determination is protected because all of 
his decisions and actions are taking place in the “advocatory” phase.157 
The Court justifies its investigatory/advocatory distinction by claiming 
that it would be unfair to offer police officers only qualified immunity for 
their investigative acts, while protecting prosecutors with absolute 
immunity for the same acts.158  However, that assumes that police and 
prosecutors are engaging in the same function while engaged in the same 
activity.159  This may not be the case.160  The way that police officers and 
prosecutors assess evidence is very different, because they are driven by 
different goals.  A police officer wants to establish probable cause to arrest 
a suspect.161  By contrast, a prosecutor has to look at the long-term picture 
and assess how to turn evidence showing probable cause into a conviction 
beyond a reasonable doubt.162  Moreover, in an ideal world, a prosecutor is 
not simply seeking another conviction; he is seeking to do justice.163  The 
prosecutor has an ethical responsibility to seek out the truth of what 
happened in the case and should not seek a conviction against a defendant 
whom the prosecutor believes to be innocent.164 
The distinction between advocatory acts and administrative acts is not 
principled either.  As long as a prosecutor can somehow link an 
administrative act to the “conduct of a trial,” the utilization of “legal 
knowledge,” or the “exercise of related discretion,” he or she is in the 
clear.165  This is not difficult to do.  The Van de Kamp Court states: 
Here, unlike other claims related to administrative decisions, an individual 
prosecutor’s error in the plaintiff’s specific criminal trial constitutes an essential 
element of the plaintiff’s claim.  The administrative obligations at issue here are thus 
 
156 Id. 
157 See Kenner, supra note 153, at 426. 
158 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275. 




163 See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION (3d 
ed. 1993). 
164 Id. 
165 Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must Place 
Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 7 (2009) (citing Van de Kamp 
v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2009)). 
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unlike administrative duties concerning, for example, workplace hiring, payroll 
administration, the maintenance of physical facilities, and the like.166 
It would indeed be striking to see the case where a criminal defendant 
brings a § 1983 action against a prosecutor’s office claiming that payroll 
administration led to the violation of his constitutional rights.  By narrowly 
equating administrative functions with actions that will rarely, if ever, 
impact a defendant, Van de Kamp has effectively closed off claims of 
liability against prosecutors under a theory of qualified immunity for 
administrative acts. 
2. The Functional Test and the Falsification of Evidence 
Beyond the problems noted above, perhaps the most egregious 
practical problem with the functional test is that the test makes it unclear 
whether prosecutors are liable under § 1983 for falsifying evidence and 
presenting it at trial.  It seems absurd that actions analogous to perjury 
should be allowed to go unpunished.167  But the Court’s functional 
approach to prosecutorial immunity has led to some bizarre circular 
reasoning in this area, best exemplified by Justice Scalia’s concurrence in 
Buckley.168  Falsified evidence cannot produce harm to a defendant until it 
is used.169  When prosecutors are preparing false evidence during their 
pretrial, pre-probable cause investigatory function, they are protected only 
by qualified immunity.170  But the harm from the false evidence does not 
occur while it is being prepared—it occurs at trial, when the evidence is 
used.  Yet by the time the prosecutor is using the false evidence at trial, he 
is protected by absolute immunity.171 
The circuits have split on how to approach this issue.  The Second, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold a prosecutor liable for producing false 
evidence under a qualified immunity theory.172  The Third and Seventh 
 
166 Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009). 
167 There are many ways that prosecutors can falsify and present evidence at trial, but for 
particular treatment of prosecutors’ knowing use of perjured testimony, see Charlie DeVore, 
Comment, A Lie Is a Lie: An Argument for Strict Protection Against a Prosecutor’s 
Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667 (2011). 
168 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 281 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Jeffrey J. McKenna, Note, Prosecutorial Immunity: Imbler, Burns, and Now Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons—The Supreme Court’s Attempt to Provide Guidance in a Difficult Area, 1994 
BYU L. REV. 663, 692–93 (reading Justice Scalia’s concurrence as saying that claims of 
false evidence should be dismissed for failure to state a claim). 
169 Buckley, 509 U.S. at 281. 
170 Id. 
171 Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. 
REV. 53, 92. 
172 See McGhee v. Pottawattamie Cnty., 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008); Milstein v. 
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Circuits have held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for 
presenting false evidence at trial.173 
Because of a fairly arbitrary test created by the Supreme Court, a 
prosecutor can actually make up evidence, present it at trial, and not be held 
civilly liable for his actions.  The criminal defendant against whom the 
evidence is presented is left without recourse.  If he is wrongfully convicted 
on the basis of false evidence, he may sit in prison for years.  If he has a 
dedicated legal team, perhaps he gets the conviction overturned and gets out 
of prison sooner.  But typically a defendant with a dedicated legal team is 
not the type of defendant who has to worry about false evidence being used 
against him without objection in the first place.  If and when he gets out, he 
may have no claim for civil damages for the prosecutor’s wrong.  
Ultimately, the functional test leads to some defendants convicted on the 
basis of false evidence spending years in prison for crimes that they did not 
commit.174 
The Supreme Court could resolve the circuit split in two ways.  First, 
the Court could rule that prosecutors are absolutely immune for presenting 
false evidence at trial.175  On the other hand, the Court could grant 
prosecutors qualified immunity for their actions at all stages of a 
prosecution, including trial, which would expose them to liability for 
 
Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Ephraim Unell, A Right Not to Be Framed: Preserving Civil Liability of Prosecutors in the 
Face of Absolute Immunity, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 955, 966 (2010); see also Johns, supra 
note 171, at 90.  Zahrey set the tone for this group of circuits.  It concluded that the 
falsification of evidence is itself the harm because the harm at trial is the “legally cognizable 
result” of the falsification.  Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 349–54; see also Unell, supra, at 964.  
McGhee utilizes similar reasoning.  McGhee, 547 F.3d at 932.  Milstein cites heavily to 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), but arrives at the same conclusion.  Milstein, 
257 F.3d at 1011; see also Johns, supra note 171, at 95. 
173 Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 
F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Unell, supra note 172, at 966–67.  The Seventh Circuit 
addressed the issue of prosecutors presenting false evidence at trial in Buckley after it was 
remanded from the Supreme Court.  Unell, supra note 172, at 964.  It basically followed 
Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Buckley, and added in the Buckley majority’s bright-line 
probable cause rule.  Id.  The prosecutors in Buckley elicited false evidence prior to a finding 
of probable cause, and were not absolutely immune.  Id.  But there was no harm at that 
point—the harm occurred at trial, when absolute immunity applied.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
declined to grant certiorari to Buckley a second time to resolve this.  See Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 513 U.S. 1085 (1995).  The Third Circuit later adopted similar reasoning in 
Michaels.  See Michaels, 222 F.3d at 122. 
174 See, e.g., Buckley, 509 U.S. at 261 (Stephen Buckley spent three years in jail); 
McGhee, 547 F.3d at 925 (Curtis McGhee and his codefendant Terry Harrington each spent 
twenty-four years in prison); Michaels, 222 F.3d at 120 (Margaret Michaels spent six years 
in prison). 
175 See infra Part V.B for a discussion of some additional implications of this course of 
action for prosecutors. 
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falsifying evidence in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights.176  
Considering how recently the Court upheld the functional test in Connick, it 
is unlikely to resolve the circuit split over the falsification of evidence any 
time soon. 
B. WHAT IS A “PATTERN”? 
Thirty-six years after Imbler, the Court has yet to articulate fully the 
scope of qualified immunity for prosecutors.  The discussion of the Connick 
case at the appellate level demonstrates this.177  No one, including no 
Justice on the Court, seems to know exactly what constitutes a “pattern” of 
violations that shows deliberate indifference and leads to qualified 
immunity and liability under § 1983.  Connick v. Thompson evaluates 
multiple scenarios that might establish a pattern, and the majority and 
dissent appear to disagree on whether liability exists for every single one.  
Unfortunately, the dissent itself is unclear on whether it is arguing for 
liability based on a single incident or a pattern.  The dissent spends a great 
deal of time and space laying out the facts that the jury had available to 
it178—including other potential Brady violations that occurred in 
Thompson’s case179 and other cases in which Connick’s office was held 
liable in civil suits for Brady violations.180  Yet it summarily concludes that 
the jury could have been holding Connick’s office liable based on a single 
 
176 See infra Part V.A for a discussion of some additional implications of this course of 
action for prosecutors. 
177 See Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350 
(2011); see also Sophia Juliana Johnson, Thompson v. Connick: The Fifth Circuit Tiptoes 
Around the Issue of Qualified Prosecutorial Immunity and Collapses Municipal and 
Vicarious Liability Under § 1983, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1403 (2010) (describing how sixteen 
appellate judges joined three separate opinions—one finding absolute immunity under Van 
de Kamp, one finding that Thompson had failed to show evidence giving rise to single-
incident liability, and one finding that the jury had sufficient evidence, in the form of a 
pattern of violations, to reasonably infer that there was deliberate indifference). 
178 See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1370–77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  The facts that 
Ginsburg’s dissent selects from the trial record certainly appear, at first blush, to indicate that 
there was other evidence concealed from Thompson’s defense team besides the lab report at 
the center of the case.  However, the majority is ultimately correct that if the dissent was 
truly pursuing a single-incident theory of liability, these other concealed bits of evidence 
would not matter.  The hidden lab report alone would be enough for the liability analysis to 
take place. 
179 Id. at 1376 n.10. 
180 Id. at 1370 (“As the trial record in the § 1983 action reveals, the conceded, long-
concealed transgressions were neither isolated nor atypical.”); see also id. at 1382 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), which 
reversed a capital conviction from Orleans Parish based on the withholding of exculpatory 
evidence). 
2012] SOMEBODY HELP ME UNDERSTAND THIS 1345 
incident.181  The dissent never argues the obvious alternative—that the jury 
clearly had enough additional information to find a pattern from the 
multiple Brady violations occurring in Thompson’s case.  This is 
particularly frustrating because each time the majority dismisses a 
definition of a pattern, the dissent’s factual evidence would seem to support 
such a definition, but the dissent stops short of actually calling anything a 
pattern. 
The Connick majority takes the view that the actions of multiple 
prosecutors in one case resulting in a single Brady violation, like in 
Thompson’s case, do not constitute a pattern.182  What if multiple 
prosecutors violate Brady multiple times in one case?  The majority swiftly 
dismisses in a footnote the idea that such behavior constitutes a pattern.183  
Could multiple prosecutors violating Brady multiple times across multiple 
cases prove a pattern?  The majority indicates that this too is insufficient to 
put a district attorney on notice of the need to train—at least in the case of 
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office.  Thompson argued that 
Connick’s office had been reversed on appeal for Brady violations four 
times in the ten years prior to his armed robbery prosecution.184  Thomas’s 
opinion discounts this because the reversed decisions did not involve the 
hiding of scientific evidence, like the blood-type report in Thompson’s 
case, but rather other forms of evidence.185  Thomas declines to state 
whether, if the other four cases had involved scientific evidence, he would 
have altered his opinion. 
What does clearly emerge from the analysis of both opinions is that 
what constitutes a pattern of constitutional violations is highly fact-bound.  
The application of this precedent regarding pattern will be difficult to apply 
to future cases.  It is unclear that even the five Justices of the majority are 
all in agreement as to what a pattern is; they just all happened to agree that 
Thompson’s case did not prove it.186 
 
181 See id. at 1377. 
182 Id. at 1360 n.7. 
183 Id. (stating that “contemporaneous or subsequent conduct cannot establish a pattern of 
violations”). 
184 Id. at 1360. 
185 Id. 
186 Moreover, in this analysis I have been using the idea of a Brady violation because that 
is what was at issue in Connick.  In reality, of course, prosecutors can violate a defendant’s 
constitutional rights in other ways as a result of a lack of training.  When you add additional 
types of constitutional violations into the mix, the fact-bound nature of this analysis becomes 
even more complicated.  For example, Prosecutor A and Prosecutor B try a case together.  In 
the first case, Prosecutor A withholds exculpatory blood evidence in violation of Brady and, 
more generally, the defendant’s due process rights.  At the same time, Prosecutor B prepares 
a witness and withholds from the defense attorney the fact that he gave the witness immunity 
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Both the majority and dissent fail to address two additional situations 
that may reasonably constitute a pattern.  First, one prosecutor could take 
actions across multiple cases, resulting in multiple Brady violations.  
Second, one prosecutor could take multiple actions in a single case that 
result in multiple Brady violations.  While there may be a “pattern” of 
violations in both instances, they stem from the actions of a single person, 
rather than a group.  That single prosecutor probably fits within Justice 
Scalia’s definition of the “miscreant prosecutor,”187 who may have some 
form of personal responsibility for his actions, but whose actions would not 
establish liability under § 1983 for the office generally. 
Neither side is particularly clear on what a single incident that gives 
rise to liability looks like either.  It appears that a single incident could 
produce liability in two ways.  First, there is the hypothetical in footnote 10 
of Harris.188  Both sides agree that this is still good law.  Second, the 
majority in Connick seems to say that something other than a pattern could 
give the district attorney a “specific reason” to know that additional training 
was necessary.189  The Court may have added this language to leave the 
 
for his testimony.  He does this in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), 
and the defendant’s due process rights.  Neither prosecutor takes these actions in bad faith; 
they simply did not receive the training they needed to know what to turn over.  Is this a 
pattern of constitutional violations?  What if in the next case, A is paired with Prosecutor C, 
and A makes the same Brady violation.  B is paired with Prosecutor D on his next case, and 
he too makes the same mistake with Giglio.  Is this a pattern?  Does that answer change if C 
and D also make Brady and Giglio violations?  How many times does a particular type of 
violation have to occur in order to be a pattern?  How does a defendant seeking to hold an 
office liable even plead a failure to train in this situation?  It is far easier to allege that 
training is flawed in just one area of the law—either Brady or Giglio alone.  Can a defendant 
allege that all of an office’s training on constitutional rights is flawed?  Is it even possible to 
prove such a thing?  Nothing in any of the two lines of cases leading up to Connick, or 
Connick itself, suggests any answers to these questions.  I suggest that is because the pattern 
test is so heavily fact-bound as to be practically unworkable. 
187 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1368 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
188 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989).  This is the only explicit 
example of liability arising from a single incident in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  The idea 
expressed in footnote 10 is that a single incidence of misconduct by a municipal employee 
resulting from an obvious failure in his training may be such a gross violation of a citizen’s 
constitutional rights that the municipality can be found deliberately indifferent to the need to 
train and can therefore be held liable under § 1983.  Id.  A municipality would be liable if it 
gave its police officers weapons without training them to know when the use of deadly force 
was acceptable, and an officer shot and killed someone when deadly force was not needed.  
Id. 
189 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363 (“A district attorney is entitled to rely on prosecutors’ 
professional training and ethical obligations in the absence of specific reason, such as a 
pattern of violations, to believe that those tools are insufficient to prevent future 
constitutional violations . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 1386 n.26 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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door open for prosecutorial liability—since its reasoning basically 
eviscerated Harris’s single-incident theory as applied to prosecutors.  This 
is because assistant district attorneys will always have attended law school 
and passed the bar,190 so the district attorney will always be free to presume, 
under Connick, that they have adequate legal training to deal with Brady 
issues.  So the “specific reason” that tips off the district attorney that more 
training is needed must be something other than inadequate training.191  The 
dissent argues that footnote 10 in Harris is directly applicable to 
Thompson’s case because, although young lawyers have been to law school 
and passed the bar, they do not necessarily know everything about the law 
that is required to do their jobs.192 
C. RECONSIDERING THE COMMON LAW FOUNDATION OF THE 
RULE 
The practical effect of all of this confusion is that prosecutors have 
absolute immunity.  Is that such a bad thing?  After all, the Court has 
repeatedly stated that in American common law, prosecutors always had 
absolute immunity.  Imbler relied heavily on common law reasoning to 
establish the functional test.193 
Section 1983 does not list any immunities at all,194 but the Court has 
simply read the immunities available under the common law of 1871 (when 
§ 1983 was passed) into the statute.195  While this approach is certainly 
artificial, it is something the Court has done in the past to reach a desired 
result.196  Unfortunately, in the prosecutorial immunity context, this 
approach makes no sense.  In Imbler, after stating that prosecutors were 
absolutely immune under the common law of 1871, the Court cites as 
evidence Griffith v. Slinkard, a case of malicious prosecution from 1896.197  
 
190 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
191 See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1386 n.26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In the end, the 
majority leaves open the possibility that something other than ‘a pattern of violations’ could 
also give the district attorney ‘specific reason’ to know that additional training is necessary.  
Connick, by his own admission, had such a reason.” (citations omitted)). 
192 See id. at 1386; supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
193 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–27 (1976). 
194 See id. at 417. 
195 See id. at 418. 
196 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (reading common law absolute 
immunity for judges into § 1983); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (reading 
common law absolute immunity for legislators into § 1983).  In Tenney, the Court concluded 
that immunities “well grounded in history and reason” had not been abrogated “by covert 
inclusion in the general language” of § 1983.  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 (quoting Tenney, 341 
U.S. at 376). 
197 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421 (citing Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896)). 
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Moreover, the Court concedes that Griffith was the first recorded case 
where absolute prosecutorial immunity is mentioned in American law.198 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Burns is more effective at describing 
the common law immunities than the majority in Imbler, but his argument 
still lacks persuasiveness as to why prosecutorial immunity should be read 
into § 1983.  In American common law, there was absolute immunity for 
judges acting in their official judicial capacities.199  There was also absolute 
immunity for government servants acting in a “quasi-judicial” capacity.200  
Finally, all statements made as part of a court proceeding were given 
absolute immunity from defamation suits.201 
The Imbler Court argued that absolute immunity should apply to 
prosecutors for the same policy reasons that absolute immunity is given to 
judges and jurors.202  In short, the immunity is designed to prevent the 
harassment of all parties to the prosecution and avoid any chilling effects 
that litigation might have.203  The Court seemed to endorse the idea that 
prosecutors share absolute immunity protection under a quasi-judicial 
theory.204  However, that is not the same thing as a grant of absolute 
immunity at common law for prosecutors in their own right.  Yet the 
Court’s jurisprudence has simplified the common law reasoning to this end.  
If the Court were to acknowledge the tenuousness of its common law 
arguments, the justification for absolute immunity and the functional test 
weakens considerably. 
Even assuming that the Court’s suppositions about absolute immunity 
in 1871 are correct, do we want modern prosecutors subjected to a rule 
 
198 See id. at 420–21. 
199 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (citing THOMAS COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS (1880)).  From its earliest days, English 
common law protected judges acting within their jurisdiction with absolute immunity.  See 
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20 (citing Floyd v. Barker, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 1305).  The United 
States Supreme Court first recognized judicial absolute immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 
U.S. 335 (1871), but it was not until Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), that judicial 
absolute immunity was applied to the states via § 1983.  Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554–55. 
200 Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The 
Court in Imbler also noted that grand jurors received absolute immunity at both English and 
American common law under a quasi-judicial theory.  See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20 
(citing Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880); Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356 (1872); Floyd v. 
Barker, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 1305). 
201 Burns, 500 U.S. at 501 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
However, a complaining witness could be subject to liability for malicious prosecution 
(which, unlike defamation, was an intentional tort).  Id.  Indeed, the absolute immunity 
applied only to defamation suits.  Id. 
202 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–23. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
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created at a time when prosecution looked very different than it does today?  
First, with the rise of DNA and other scientific technology, there have been 
major advances in the collection of evidence since the common law rules 
regarding prosecutors were developed.  Because there are so many more 
types of forensic evidence available to prosecutors today, there are also 
more opportunities for them to hide or tamper with that evidence.  
Additionally, prosecutors today are saddled with enormous caseloads that 
simply did not exist when the common law was developing.205  There are 
more incentives now than ever before to cut corners in order to obtain 
convictions and speed up the trial process.206  Prosecutors’ offices do not 
have the resources to handle the extraordinary number of cases.207  To 
maintain conviction rates, the temptation to conceal exculpatory evidence in 
violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights is strong.208  However, 
despite the drastic differences between early and modern American 
prosecution, there are compelling reasons for the Court to institute an 
absolute immunity rule today. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS 
There are plenty of ways to regulate prosecutors without overhauling 
Supreme Court precedent.  But having the Court impose a new immunity 
rule will be more efficient, while also avoiding the significant 
disadvantages of the common reform proposals.  While they intuitively 
seem sound, the proposed reforms have severe practical disadvantages that 
prevent them from being viable alternatives to a new rule from the Court.  
The most common proposals for regulation are more stringent or better 
 
205 STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 (2011).  State prosecutors closed 2.9 million 
felony cases in 2007, approximately ninety-four felony cases for every prosecuting attorney 
on staff.  Id.; see also Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: 
How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
261 (2011) (discussing the number of cases assigned to prosecutors in the largest 
prosecutors’ offices in the country, and the broad negative impact that such caseloads have 
on the criminal justice system). 
206 See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 560 (2007) (“[P]rosecutors are well aware that continuing to 
withhold favorable evidence may enhance the opportunity for a guilty plea and may also 
impair a defendant’s pretrial preparation.”); Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 205, at 282–
85 (describing specifically how excessive caseloads prevent prosecutors from turning over 
Brady material to criminal defendants). 
207 See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 205, at 275–76. 
208 See Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 355, 390 (2001) (“The desire to win inevitably wins out over matters of 
procedural fairness, such as disclosure.”). 
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enforced ethical sanctions209 and internal office reforms,210 although 
multiple other mechanisms have been suggested.211 
 
209 See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical 
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275 (2007); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken 
System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399; Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against 
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987); Walter W. 
Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965 (1984); Fred 
C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001); Fred 
C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought 
Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Lesley E. Williams, 
Note, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441 (1999). 
210 See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2105–12 (2010) (advocating a corporate compliance model for 
structuring prosecutors’ offices); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus 
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 996–1016 (2009) (advocating internal 
restructuring of prosecutors’ offices); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: 
Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 460–64 (2001) 
(advocating public information departments and prosecution review boards); Bennett L. 
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 448–58 (1992) (advocating 
expanded discovery, prosecutor misconduct commissions, and movement toward the British 
model, which relies partly on private lawyers drafted by the government to handle cases on a 
piecemeal basis); Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure 
Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2161, 2182–86 (2010) (advocating greater auditing of prosecutors’ files, more 
extensive internal review, and establishing review processes that make it possible to admit 
that wrongdoing occurred so that it can be addressed before the case goes too far in the 
appeals process); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 169–81 (2004) [hereinafter The Zeal 
Deal] (advocating better training, incentives, independent internal innocence units to review 
claims, restructuring elections, and abandoning the public prosecutor model altogether in 
favor of the British model, which has some public prosecution but relies partly on private 
lawyers drafted by the government to handle cases on a piecemeal basis); Daniel S. Medwed, 
The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the Post-
Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 58–65 (2009) [hereinafter Minister of Justice] 
(advocating independent internal innocence units); Scott J. Krischke, Note, Absent 
Accountability: How Prosecutorial Impunity Hinders the Fair Administration of Justice in 
America, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 395, 432–34 (2010) (advocating federal- and state-level legislation 
to regulate prosecutors, independent review boards attached to all prosecutors’ offices, and 
criminal sanctions for misbehaving prosecutors); Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive 
Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1114–15 (1994) (advocating a prosecutorial conduct commission—
analogous to a state inspector general—that would investigate misconduct); Andrew Smith, 
Note, Brady Obligations, Criminal Sanctions, and Solutions in a New Era of Scrutiny, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1935, 1960–72 (2008) (advocating open-file policies, better enforcement of 
criminal sanctions against prosecutors, greater internal regulation, and increased media 
transparency). 
211 See Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
441, 448–51 (2009) (paying monetary incentives to prosecutors based on ethical 
performance); Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising 
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If prosecutorial immunity continues to have a wide scope under 
§ 1983, ethical sanctions may be the only way to address prosecutorial 
misbehavior and mete out punishment.  Part of the Imbler Court’s reasoning 
for broadly allowing absolute immunity was that the profession would 
sanction prosecutors who crossed ethical lines, even if they could not be 
held civilly liable.212  Unfortunately, in the thirty-six years since Imbler, 
prosecution of prosecutors for ethical violations has been rare in 
comparison with the number of ethical violations that occur.213  Self-
regulation has not changed behavior because prosecutors are well aware 
that, in practice, they are unlikely to face any professional consequences for 
skirting ethical rules.214 
 
Prosecutors: Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 426–30 (2009) (advocating holding 
supervisors responsible for subordinates’ misconduct that they knew or should have known 
occurred); Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1088–93 (2009) (naming 
prosecutors who engage in misconduct in appeals decisions overturning those cases); Janet 
C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1133, 1151–54 (2005) (suggesting abolishing the public prosecutor and 
moving to the English system); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 
901–11 (1995) (advocating financial awards for prosecutors whose cases make it through 
appeals without error); Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1532–48 (2009) (reducing the defendant’s sentence in cases 
where misconduct has occurred); Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining in the Minister of Justice: 
Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 155–61 (2007) (using 
the superseder power, in which a district attorney, judge, or state executive appoints a special 
prosecutor to “supersede” local prosecuting attorneys when misconduct has been 
discovered); Kelly Gier, Note, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of Misconduct, 33 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 191, 205–12 (2006) (proposing a mixture of increased ethical scrutiny and 
internal office reforms, including keeping repeat offenders off of death penalty cases, 
protecting whistleblowers more effectively, and preventing offenders from entering top 
positions within the prosecutor’s office); Moshe Zvi Marvit, Note, Who’s Afraid of 
Municipal Liability? The Supreme Court’s Strange Exclusion of § 1983 Respondeat Superior 
Municipal Liability, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 461, 477–90 (2011) (interpreting § 1983 as 
allowing municipalities to be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior). 
212 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976). 
213 See KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–
2009 (2010), available at http://law.scu.edu/ncip/file/ProsecutorialMisconduct_BookEntire_
online%20version.pdf; Rosen, supra note 209; Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a 
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory 
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833 (1997); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial 
& Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1. 
214 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline 
Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV. 275, 294 (2004) (noting that there is a “human tendency to push 
margins when there are no sufficiently demanding external controls”); see also Joy, supra 
note 209, at 426–27. 
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If courts and the profession will not address misconduct, the next step 
may be to force prosecutors’ offices to self-regulate internally.  A common 
suggestion is that prosecutors’ offices move to an open-file system, in 
which any and all discovery is handed over to defense counsel.215  At least 
one author has suggested that offices move to a corporate compliance-style 
model to ensure greater accountability by assistant district attorneys.216  
Several authors have advocated for internal review boards that would 
investigate wrongful convictions and address prosecutors’ ethical 
failings.217  These suggestions are severely limited by the fact that district 
attorneys have little incentive to implement complex and costly internal 
reforms without substantive data indicating that the reforms produce 
results.218  The overwhelming number of cases that the typical prosecutor’s 
office charges in a year, without an accompanying increase in funding, 
leaves neither money nor time to deal with an overhaul of internal 
processes.219 
Moreover, a problem inherent across these proposals is that the 
institutions that would have to implement the reforms—whether the 
prosecutors’ offices themselves or legislatures—are resistant to change.220  
Prosecutors dealing with massive caseloads and politicians deadlocked over 
state budget concerns in a stagnant economy are not going to expend time, 
energy, and political capital dealing with violations of criminal defendants’ 
constitutional rights.221  Whether right or wrong, the political will to 
 
215 See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533 
(2010); Gershman, supra note 206, at 449–51; Smith, supra note 210, at 1960–66. 
216 See Barkow, supra note 210, at 2105–12 (advocating that prosecutors’ offices utilize 
training, supervision, transparency, and reporting in the way that a corporation would in 
order to avoid wrongdoing). 
217 See Bibas, supra note 210; Davis, supra note 210; Gershman, supra note 210; Green, 
supra note 210; Medwed, The Zeal Deal, supra note 210; Medwed, Minister of Justice, 
supra note 210; Krischke, supra note 210; Morton, supra note 210; Smith, supra note 210. 
218 To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive study measuring a decrease in wrongful 
convictions in prosecutors’ offices that have instituted some form of internal reform.  For 
additional institutional characteristics that inhibit reform, see Green, supra note 210, at 
2171–73 (describing the general skepticism and conservatism that mark prosecutors’ 
offices). 
219 See generally PERRY & BANKS, supra note 205 (finding that while the total operating 
budget of state prosecutors’ offices had decreased by 5% from 2001 to 2007, there were 
approximately ninety-four felony cases charged per prosecuting attorney on staff). 
220 See Green, supra note 210, at 2171–73. 
221 This is not to say that they do not care about these issues at all, just that other 
concerns tend to take precedence.  District attorneys and legislators are elected officials, and 
convicted criminals cannot vote and criminal defendants do not make up a politically active 
constituency.  Politicians have little incentive to champion major reforms to benefit criminal 
defendants.  For a more thorough treatment of how political concerns can impact criminal 
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execute these reforms simply does not exist—making action by the 
Supreme Court all the more necessary. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT MUST IMPOSE A NEW RULE IN THIS AREA 
The unsuitability of these alternative potential reforms means that the 
Supreme Court must be responsible for implementing a coherent liability 
rule.  If the Supreme Court is truly to simplify the issue of prosecutorial 
liability under § 1983 by eliminating the functional test, it has two options.  
First, it could grant prosecutors qualified immunity across the board.  
Alternatively, the Court could give prosecutors absolute immunity in all 
situations.  The absolute immunity rule already exists in practice, and there 
are compelling reasons for the Court to make it official. 
A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Broad qualified immunity for prosecutors is another favored solution 
among academics for reducing constitutional violations during 
prosecution.222  Protection from police misconduct under § 1983 is more 
rigorous than protection from prosecutorial misconduct under the same 
statute because the police may only invoke qualified immunity as a 
defense.223  If prosecutors were as carefully scrutinized as the police, so the 
argument goes, they might have less incentive to violate defendants’ 
constitutional rights in the course of the trial.  This would lower the rate of 
wrongful convictions and bring greater fairness to the criminal adjudicatory 
process. 
The primary problem with qualified immunity for prosecutors is that it 
may have a chilling effect on how prosecutors choose to prosecute.224  If 
prosecutors worry about being held civilly liable for their actions during a 
 
law, see William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 529–39 (2001).  
222 Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute 
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 527–35 (2011); Douglas J. McNamara, 
Buckley, Imbler, and Stare Decisis: The Present Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity 
and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135, 1190–92 (1996); Williams, supra 
note 209, at 3479–80.  Other authors, while not advocating qualified immunity for 
prosecutors in all situations, have argued that the current absolute immunity that is 
sometimes granted needs to be restricted.  See Brink, supra note 165, at 31–36; Unell, supra 
note 172, at 967–69. 
223 Compare Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (giving prosecutors absolute 
immunity for their activities as advocates and qualified immunity for investigative and 
administrative actions), with Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (granting police 
officers qualified immunity based on whether they behaved reasonably in light of clearly 
established law and the circumstances). 
224 See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423–24. 
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prosecution, it may change their behavior in a way that leads to less zealous 
advocacy.225  This was a major concern of the Imbler Court, and has been 
reiterated throughout the Court’s prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence 
since 1976.226 
Moreover, another Supreme Court decision may lessen the desired 
impact of qualified immunity on prosecutors’ behavior.  In Heck v. 
Humphrey,227 the Court held that to recover damages under § 1983, a 
plaintiff must show that his conviction was reversed on direct appeal, 
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called 
into question by a federal court’s writ of habeas corpus.228  Even if 
misconduct occurred in a defendant’s case, the defendant has to prove that 
it was so egregious that it affected the verdict.229  The subsequent retrial 
must then lead to a reversal of the verdict.230  This is a very high standard 
for defendants to meet, and their success is particularly dependent on the 
legal resources that are available to them.  Instituting qualified immunity 
may just lead prosecutors to engage in balancing.  They will weigh the 
chances that their behavior will lead to reversal on appeal, actually giving 
rise to liability for their actions.  If the prosecutor finds the likelihood of 
reversal sufficiently low, or is willing to take the risk, a significant amount 
of misconduct will occur regardless of the qualified immunity rule.231 
B. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
Giving prosecutors absolute immunity for all of their actions has not 
been advocated by anyone—except perhaps the Supreme Court, whose 
decisions produce absolute immunity in effect if not in form.232  The 
 
225 Id. 
226 See id.; see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 346–47 (2009); Buckley v. 
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 n.4 (1993). 
227 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
228 Id. at 486–87. 
229 Id.  For the requirements to achieve a reversal based on the withholding of 
exculpatory evidence, see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (holding that a 
prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence is “material” such that it affects the verdict 
and warrants reversal only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the outcome of the trial would have been different). 
230 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. 
231 For an argument that prosecutors already engage in this type of balancing, see 
Gershman, supra note 206, at 548–50.  Bagley’s materiality standard, “allow[s] prosecutors 
to play and frequently beat the odds that their suppression of evidence, even if discovered, 
will be found immaterial by a court.”  Id. at 549. 
232 But see Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Thoughts on Damages for Wrongful 
Convictions, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 152–61 (2010).  While Rosenthal is highly critical 
of the impact that a broad qualified immunity rule would have, he stops short of actually 
advocating for straight absolute immunity. 
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obvious problem with an absolute immunity rule is that a criminal 
defendant wrongly convicted based on misconduct directly attributable to 
his prosecutor has no recourse for the violation of his constitutional rights.  
This would be less worrisome if prosecutors were routinely held 
accountable for their actions through professional disciplinary measures.  
However, prosecutors are very rarely called before disciplinary committees 
for their actions, and are even more rarely disbarred.233 
In spite of this, the Supreme Court should scrap its prior jurisprudence 
and articulate a rule that provides absolute immunity for prosecutors in all 
situations.  While not a perfect solution, absolute immunity has many 
advantages over the current rule of mixed absolute and qualified immunity, 
and is pragmatically more appropriate than a qualified immunity rule. 
First, instituting absolute immunity in all instances would clear up the 
muddy waters of the law.  Judges would have a rule that is simple to 
apply234: prosecutors’ offices and municipalities have no liability, and 
therefore no exposure to multimillion-dollar judgments.235  Defense 
attorneys and defendants will not spend years engaged in additional 
litigation after the reversal of a conviction, only to lose a civil suit because 
both sides had difficulty interpreting and applying the standard.236  Finally, 
absolute immunity is in complete accord with the common law tradition.237 
Second, the twenty-four-hour news cycle helps make an absolute 
immunity rule viable by providing a layer of accountability.  The intense 
scrutiny that all elected officials, including district attorneys, are subject to 
today was completely unknown to the worlds of Imbler and the common 
law.  It is much easier for citizens to track how their elected officials are 
behaving, make decisions about how to vote, and demand greater 
transparency in government. 
Americans are taking greater notice of the criminal justice system’s 
failings, and the media has played a major role in that.  Various innocence 
projects across the country have taught the public what wrongful 
 
233 See supra notes 212–214 and accompanying text. 
234 For why this is both an important and needed development, see note 177 and 
accompanying text. 
235 See infra notes 250–252 and accompanying text. 
236 Note that John Thompson spent twenty-six years of his life engaged in litigation—
criminal and civil—with the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office.  Eight of those years 
(and presumably the sort of hours on the part of his attorneys that would normally result in 
millions of dollars in fees) were spent on his § 1983 action, which the Supreme Court 
eventually threw out, along with his $14 million in damages. 
237 Although as I have suggested, supra Part III.C, the Court’s interpretation of the 
common law of prosecutorial immunity is tenuous at best, and probably of little practical 
value given the complexity of the prosecutorial function today. 
1356 KATE MCCLELLAND [Vol. 102 
convictions are, how they happen, and how they destroy lives.238  
Campaigns to save death row inmates from execution when the evidence 
against them is weak are becoming more prominent.239  In some states, the 
worry about wrongful convictions has become so great that the death 
penalty has been abolished or suspended altogether.240  Inevitably, this 
intense scrutiny leads to the prosecutors of wrongful convictions being 
publicly named by the media.241  This makes it harder for their offices to 
either cover up their behavior or continue their employment.  The public 
naming and subsequent shaming of prosecutors who engage in ethically 
questionable behavior will provide a deterrent to others considering such 
behavior. 
But will this deterrent effect be enough?242  Bad press affects an 
elected district attorney the most, but it is his subordinates who are really 
making the daily decisions that violate constitutional rights.  For all of the 
talk about “policymakers” and supervisors in the case law, the decision to 
engage in unethical behavior is made by the one or two line prosecutors 
who try the defendant’s case.  They are not elected, and so may not care 
much about bad press. They may see their jobs as engaging in a quest for 
justice, and they may believe that the ends justify the means in such a 
 
238 See About the Organization: Other Projects Around the World, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Other-Projects.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
239 The recent campaign to save Troy Davis, spearheaded by Amnesty International, is an 
excellent example of this phenomenon.  Troy Davis was convicted of first-degree murder in 
Georgia and spent many years on death row while exhausting all of his appeals.  See Troy 
Davis, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troy_Davis (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).  
During this process, nearly all of the prosecution’s witnesses against him recanted their 
original testimony.  Id.  Nonetheless, his conviction was upheld multiple times and he was 
not granted clemency.  Id.  Davis was executed by the State of Georgia on September 21, 
2011.  Id. 
240 These include: Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin, in addition to the District of Columbia.  See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf.  New Mexico and Connecticut have abolished the death 
penalty, but since the legislation is not retroactive, some inmates remain on death row.  Id. 
241 It will be the media doing the naming, too—even in appeals cases where judges take 
prosecutors to task for misbehavior, they rarely name the prosecutors.  See Gershowitz, 
supra note 211, at 1062.  But see David Lat, Benchslap of the Day: Say My Name, Say My 
Name, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 16, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/bench
slap-of-the-day-say-my-name-say-my-name/#more-136265.  Of course, judges are members 
of the same profession as prosecutors.  Members of the news media are not constrained by 
such ties. 
242 Moreover, the media’s power can be a double-edged sword.  Brink has noted that 
increased media attention may also pressure prosecutors “to bring charges quickly and to 
win convictions.”  Brink, supra note 165, at 12.  Such a situation may encourage 
misconduct, rather than eliminate it.  See id. at 9. 
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pursuit.243  Moreover, criminal defendants are not a sympathetic group—
those who share an office and a community with these prosecutors may 
support a conviction at any cost.244 
But absolute immunity should be conferred on prosecutors not only for 
its advantages, but also because of the severe disadvantages of the current 
qualified immunity rule.  Despite the tendency of the literature to bemoan 
even the current absolute immunity of prosecutors, which is limited to their 
advocatory functions, there are major drawbacks to making prosecutors 
liable for misconduct under a qualified immunity rule.  First, there is 
substantial evidence that awarding money damages in § 1983 cases will 
have little or no impact on prosecutorial behavior.245  This is in part because 
the prosecutor who actually violated the defendant’s constitutional rights is 
not personally liable for paying the damages awarded to the plaintiff in 
subsequent litigation.246  It is strategically more sensible to go after an 
entire office rather than an individual prosecutor because the prosecutor will 
rarely have deep enough pockets to satisfy the type of judgment that a 
defendant-turned-civil-litigant will be seeking.247  Additionally, the 
combination of the Imbler and Monell lines of cases has made it easier for 
litigants to frame alleged § 1983 violations by prosecutors as “failure to 
train” claims, which implicate a policymaker and the office more 
broadly.248  So even under a qualified immunity rule, prosecutors’ personal 
wealth is not at stake in civil litigation, which makes the threat of litigation 
less likely to directly impact their behavior during criminal trials.249 
Within municipalities, prosecutors’ offices are not moneymakers.  
They have to be allocated money for their operating costs every year out of 
the municipality’s budget.  Municipalities typically raise money through a 
variety of taxes—property, sales, etc.  Because prosecutors’ offices raise no 
money independently, the municipality is also going to be responsible for 
paying—with taxpayer money—any jury awards of civil damages against 
 
243 See Medwed, The Zeal Deal, supra note 210, at 134–48, for a thorough description of 
the culture of prosecutors’ offices and how that leads prosecutors to engage in misconduct 
and prevents them from correcting their mistakes when they may have convicted an innocent 
person. 
244 See also infra Conclusion. 
245 See Rosenthal, supra note 232, at 152–61. 
246 Id. at 152.  The other thing a prosecutor might have to lose is his job.  But the reality 
is that prosecutorial misconduct often takes years to be discovered.  The subsequent civil 
litigation takes additional years.  Many prosecutors will have moved on by the time a 
judgment is actually entered on a civil case awarding damages. 
247 Compare John Thompson’s jury award of $14 million with the average salary of a 
District Attorney in 2007, which was $98,000.  See PERRY & BANKS, supra note 205, at 2. 
248 See supra Part II. 
249 See Rosenthal, supra note 232, at 129–30. 
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prosecutors.250  When taxpayers see their money paying for prosecutors’ 
mistakes, they may translate their outrage into votes against the elected 
district attorney and the district attorney will have greater incentive to 
punish misbehaving prosecutors.  But this assumes that voters will make the 
necessary connections among events.  Although subject to direct political 
pressure from the municipality about budget and spending, the district 
attorney is primarily concerned about getting enough votes to get 
reelected.251  If voters are not making the connection between their tax 
dollars and prosecutorial misconduct, the district attorney is in the clear.  
Moreover, the average prosecutor making an in-the-moment call about 
whether to withhold exculpatory evidence, for example, is so far removed 
from municipal budget decisions that he or she is unlikely to feel pressured 
one way or another by a threat of civil liability.252 
The cost of prosecution is only a fraction of a municipality’s budget.  
Especially since the economic downturn began in 2008, many 
municipalities have experienced budget difficulties.253  When budgets are 
stretched so thin, it quickly becomes apparent that money spent paying civil 
damages is money that is not being spent on schools, roads, and other 
government services.254  But if someone’s constitutional rights have been 
violated, how can the courts not give them redress?  Well, a multimillion-
dollar civil award to recompense one defendant for his violated rights 
means that millions of dollars are not getting spent on entities like public 
defenders’ offices that help protect hundreds of defendants’ constitutional 
rights every day. 
But let us suppose for a moment that despite all of these concerns, the 
Supreme Court adopts a broad qualified immunity rule and prosecutors 
finally feel the pressure of impending punishment for misbehavior.  The 
district attorney makes it clear to his subordinates that any future 
misconduct may result in large civil damages against the office.  The 
unspoken implication is that the line prosecutor who engages in this 
misconduct will be placing her job and reputation in jeopardy.  What are the 
prosecutor’s incentives going forward?  Obviously, she will want to avoid 
having a conviction overturned because of misconduct at all costs.  
Intuitively that seems like a good thing.  But at least some prosecutors will 
engage in misconduct anyway—whether by accident, because they think 
 
250 See id. at 134–35. 
251 See id. at 153–54; see also Stuntz, supra note 221, at 533–34. 
252 See Rosenthal, supra note 232, at 158–59. 
253 See Richard W. Trotter, Running on Empty: Municipal Insolvency and Rejection of 
Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45, 45–46 
(2011). 
254 See id. at 135. 
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they can get away with it, or for any number of other reasons.  If 
confronted, then they have an incentive to cover up their mistakes to avoid 
the harmful consequences.255  This will make it even more difficult for a 
defendant to prove either his innocence or the prosecutor’s wrongdoing 
postconviction.256 
Granting absolute immunity for prosecutors should not be mistaken as 
granting prosecutors permission to engage in a free-for-all.  Absolute 
immunity will undoubtedly protect some miscreant prosecutors who will 
trample defendants’ constitutional rights with impunity.  But the current 
mixture of qualified and absolute immunity has not solved this problem 
either.  It has led to a law that encourages defendants who have genuinely 
suffered wrongs into endless litigation with elements that are nearly 
impossible to prove.  A clearly articulated absolute immunity rule would at 
least prevent this more insidious form of unfairness against criminal 
defendants.  Additionally, absolute immunity for prosecutors does not alter 
the current ethical and criminal sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct.  It 
may even increase enforcement of those ethical and criminal sanctions since 
when money damages are removed from the equation, those sanctions will 
among the few avenues left to defendants seeking to right the wrongs done 
to them. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The most common sense and expedient way of dealing with the 
pervasive issue of prosecutorial misconduct is for the Supreme Court to 
articulate a rule that grants prosecutors absolute immunity in all cases.  The 
functional test initially proposed in Imbler has proven difficult to apply and 
is practically unworkable as currently formulated.  The combination of 
Imbler’s progeny and the municipal liability cases has forced litigants to 
frame the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in a highly specific and 
artificial way.  Criminal defendants claiming a violation of their 
constitutional rights must allege that the district attorney was deliberately 
indifferent to the need to train his subordinates.  Only showing a pattern of 
constitutional violations by prosecutors can prove this.  Yet there is no clear 
standard in the case law for how to prove a pattern.  The Connick opinion 
even seems to prevent defendants from ever proving a pattern, because all 
prosecutors have passed the bar and attended law school, so their district 
attorney will always be justified in believing that they know how to avoid 
 
255 Zacharias and Green have noted the incentive that strict ethical sanctions create to 
cover up misconduct, but it has not been considered in the context of qualified immunity.  
See Zacharias & Green, supra note 209, at 41–42. 
256 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976). 
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constitutional violations. 
In certain exceptional cases, a defendant may be allowed to show that 
a prosecutor’s behavior was so obviously in violation of the Constitution 
that a single violation amounts to deliberate indifference.  The Court has 
never found a municipality liable on the basis of a single incident, despite 
the availability of this alternative method of proof since the Harris decision 
in 1989.  The majority in Connick rejected Thompson’s case under this 
standard.  Ginsburg’s dissent complicated the matter by claiming 
Thompson had proved single-incident liability, but then articulating all of 
the incidents that may have proven a pattern of constitutional violations in 
Thompson’s case. 
Connick has left the state of prosecutorial liability hopelessly 
confused—not that it was a shining example of clarity prior to Connick.  In 
addition to the weak functional test, the Court’s analysis of the common law 
foundations of prosecutorial absolute immunity reads like fiction.  Even if 
there was common law precedent for an absolute immunity rule, 
prosecution has changed so drastically since early American common law 
that the justifications for the rule are moot today. 
Most of the commentators following these trends in the Court are 
convinced that more oversight is the answer to the problem of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  The suggestions put forth regarding ethical reform and internal 
restructuring of prosecutors’ offices are completely out of touch with 
reality.  Prosecutors’ offices lack both the resources and the institutional 
will to implement even some of the simplest reforms proposed.  
Additionally, prosecutors as a group have proven remarkably resilient to 
efforts to alter—even slightly—how they do their jobs.  The culture of 
prosecutors’ offices has much to do with this mindset, but it is reinforced by 
the reluctance of other attorneys, judges, legislatures, and voters to interfere 
with the work of those who keep criminals in prison. 
Absolute immunity for prosecutors already exists in practice, now the 
Court needs to make it official and overrule the Imbler line of cases to the 
extent that they articulate a mixed qualified and absolute regime.  The 
violation of criminal defendants’ constitutional rights by the people who 
prosecute them is grossly unfair.  But it is even more grossly unfair that 
those defendants who successfully overcome a wrongful conviction on the 
basis of prosecutorial misconduct are led to believe that the law will 
provide them some recompense under § 1983.  It almost never has, and 
after Connick, the chances that it ever will have decreased dramatically. 
An absolute immunity rule will almost certainly allow some 
prosecutors to get away with malicious, egregious, and flagrantly 
unconstitutional behavior.  But the reality is that American society is 
unwilling to pay the costs that would be associated with having only 
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qualified immunity for prosecutors.  Part of this mindset is the very 
legitimate concern that the award of damages under a qualified immunity 
regime detracts from other valuable societal objectives.  But another part of 
this attitude is the general lack of empathy that Americans have for criminal 
defendants, even those who have eventually been proven innocent.  Justice 
Thomas’s opinion in Connick exemplifies this—his reasoning is dismissive, 
and at points almost facile, in spite of the fact that he was deciding a case in 
which an innocent man had spent twenty-six years of his life fighting the 
system that should have protected him.  Changes in this attitude must come 
from the citizens themselves, because they will not come from changing the 
rules governing prosecutors.  Somebody will have to help them understand 
that, but that is the subject of another work. 
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